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The economics profession has attained a degree of public recognition 
as practical experts, not accorded the other social sciences. This is an 
invidious but true observation. Much of this reputation can be credited 
(or blamed) to a sequence of undermining events which took place 
within the economy and inside the economics profession itself. The phase 
of major change on this route begins with the decade of the 1930's. By 
now, the change is substantially complete, and we are entering a new 
stage. At the center of the post 1930 developments are the ideas popu-
larly associated with John Maynard Keynes. Only recently, however, has 
social science knowledge permitted a clear historical perspective of the 
"new" economics. Events, distance, historical scholarship and theoretical 
synthesis have all contributed to this overview. 
Three recent books, when considered together, provide a good his-
torical view of Keynesian ideas. They also provide a basis for an assess-
ment of the importance and the adequacy of the Keynesian element in 
current economics. One of these books, and the focus of this article, is 
New Dimensions of Political Economy, by Walter Heller. It deals pri-
marily with the policy triumph of Keynes in the 1960's. Two other books 
are drawn upon to facilitate an interpretation of Heller's study in particu-
lar, and of Keynesian ideas in general. The first is Robert Lekachman, 
The Age of Keynes. And John Kenneth Galbraith, The Neiv Industrial 
State is the second. 
waiter heller, new dimensions of political economy 
Mr. Heller has held a vantage point shared by only a few economists. 
He left his position as Chairman of the Department of Economics at the 
University of Minnesota in January, 1961, to assume the Chairmanship 
of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Kennedy. Mr. 
Heller also served for a time in this capacity under President Johnson, 
but in November, 1964, he returned to the University of Minnesota. 
His book is a commentary upon the Council of Economic Advisers 
and upon the economic policy of the 1960's. The interest and attraction 
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o£ the work derive from a freshness and realism supplied by an author 
who has been a part of the policy making establishment. 
Heller has firm, but well reasoned opinions. He writes with the 
evangelistic zeal of a man who is sincerely committed to the attitudes 
and values of the Administrations in which he served. Yet the cost of 
such a close indulgent involvement is the absence of any real critique 
or any sense of historical and temporal relativity. 
The book is an explication of two themes. First, Heller believes an 
important breakthrough in the application of economic knowledge took 
place during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. Advances in 
economic technique along with public acceptance of the ideas facilitated 
this achievement. A second theme is that in the 1960's, the older Eisen-
hower policy of smoothing the business cycle (a receding residue of 
classical thinking) was replaced by a new economic policy of "gap-closing 
and non-inflationary growth." 
The role of an economic adviser. As background for the first theme, 
the complex matrix from which policy emerges is described with well 
selected detail. As is well known, economic analysis is only one of the 
determinants of economic policy. Of equal importance are the priorities 
on competing economic objectives, limited public understanding and the 
access of the Council to the mind of the President. Thus, an effective and 
acceptible economic adviser must possess expertise not only in technical 
economics, but also in the political and educational (or indoctrinating) 
task of helping "the president push out 'the bounds of the possible.' " 
First in importance, however, are the analytical qualifications of the 
economic adviser. The economist has an analytical service to offer, as his 
approach is to "define problems and cast up solutions in terms that 
clearly tell the decision maker how he can serve one objective at mini-
mum cost to others, for example, how he can serve the ends of full em-
ployment . . . at minimum cost to price stability." This practice of 
thinking in marginal rather than all or nothing terms, and of quantifying 
where possible, coincides with the type of analytical needs present wher-
ever policy is being formed or evaluated. 
President Kennedy possessed both knowledge of and interest in mod-
ern economic principles. As a consequence, he was sensitive to the poten-
tial role of the economic adviser. In both direct and indirect ways, Mr. 
Kennedy himself was an important influence in translating Keynesian 
analysis into actual economic policy. His response to stagnation in the 
economy during the early 1960's illustrates this point. 
When President Kennedy assumed office, slack in the economy cost 
society f30 billion annually in sacrificed goods and services. Soon after 
his inauguration, the President demonstrated his awareness of this prob-
lem and his commitment to action, by supporting a tax cut to boost 
consumer and business spending. The Council of Economic Advisers 
urged a planned budget deficit to be induced by a cut in individual and 
corporate income tax rates. Economists have long recommended this 
type of action to deal with unemployment. But politically, it marked the 
first time that a deficit had been created in an open, discretionary way, 
with a careful calculation of the magnitudes of change needed. There 
were times when Mr. Kennedy harbored self doubts, due to public and 
Congressional resistance to unbalancing the federal budget, but eventu-
ally he became firmly committed to the Council's advice. 
Economic policy in the 1960's. In his second and closely related 
theme, Walter Heller considers the economic record of the 1960's. He 
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stresses a break with the economic policy of the preceding decade. A not 
too tacit assumption of policy during the 1950's, was that resilience 
inhered in the private economy to restore full employment after a reces-
sion. Such a sanguine diagnosis, left for the federal government only the 
limited role of softening recessions and dampening overly buoyant booms. 
But as the economy stagnated in the late 1950's and the early 1960's, 
economic reality contradicted the older diagnosis. In contrast, an Admin-
istration willing to apply Keynesian analysis was well equipped to deal 
with the situation. The label for the policy embarked upon is "gap-closing 
and non-inflationary growth." 
Several existing Keynesian tools were introduced to implement the 
approach. One of the central implemental concepts is "GNP gap." The 
notion is a simple one. It refers to the difference between actual produc-
tion and potential production. The higher the level of unemployment of 
economic resources, the greater will be the GNP gap. The amount of 
gap for past periods can be estimated, or one can calculate future poten-
tial deficiencies in spending and production. The concept points directly 
toward a quantification of the amount of demand creation (or destruc-
tion) required of public policy. Policy action can take either the form of 
a change in the levels of tax rates, government expenditures or some 
combination of the two. 
In this context, Heller observes that the 1964 tax cut derives directly 
from the economics textbook. And the response of the economy to the 
lower taxes was very nearly of the same magnitude as predicted. But by 
1966, inflationary pressures had developed due to heavy spending on the 
Vietnam War. And inflation is an unsolved policy problem. As is com-
mon knowledge, resistance to higher taxes makes it difficult to raise tax 
rates. However, inability to proceed with sufficient speed is even more 
of a problem. Heller pleads for a grant of authority to some governmen-
tal agency to enable it to temporarily raise or lower taxes as required by 
inflation and unemployment. 
Although Heller led in advocating tax cuts as an instrument in boost-
ing demand in 1964, he suggests that in the future (beyond Vietnam), 
other alternatives will hold higher priority. For example, increased fed-
eral government expenditures will be necessary "to repair the ravages of 
the growth process. If as byproducts in our quest for growth, we destroy 
the purity of air and water, generate ugliness and social disorder, displace 
workers and their skills, gobble up our natural resources, and chew up the 
amenities in and around our cities, the repair of that damage should have 
first call on the proceeds of growth." 
A second avenue of need is the easing of state and local tax pressures. 
Heller feels strongly that federal revenues should be shared with the 
states. This subject has long been of interest to Heller and as a result 
the space devoted to it considerably exceeds that dictated by the major 
theme of the book. 
Appraisal. The reviewer is in agreement with many of the well rea-
soned and empirically grounded views offered by Heller. Yet both the 
analysis and the mood of the book are unsatisfactory and disturbing 
at points. 
Heller, in effect, announces a new era of economic truth in govern-
ment policy. The cause for rejoicing is the widespread acceptance of 
Keynesian analytical ideas by the larger public. Since these Keynesian 
analytical concepts have been widely held by the economics profession, 
Heller's enthusiasm over public acceptance is understandable. And he 
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has played an important role in their wider dissemination. But there is 
a real danger of a new dogma developing to replace the old. In fact this 
hardening process is already quite advanced. 
The rigidifying coalescence is brought out by Heller's statement con-
cerning dissent: "Minds have opened, and the area of common ground 
has grown. Doubters, disbelievers, and dissenters remain. Some vaguely 
feel it's 'too good to be true.' Others cling to beliefs too long cherished 
to flee before mere facts. But they are increasingly outside the main body 
of economic policy consensus." 
Since economic truth can not be pinned down once and for all, dogma, 
regardless of its form, is a problem to be guarded against. Heller's atti-
tude is far from complacent on the new problems we face. Nonetheless, 
there is an overemphasis on Keynesian control of effective demand as a 
solution to unemployment and inflationary problems. Their point of 
critique will be further developed later. 
robert lekachman, the age of keynes 
Robert Lekachman's historically sensitive study, The Age of Keynes, 
is a refreshing work to place beside that of Walter Heller. The book is 
a sympathetic and perceptive history of Keynes' life and ideas. And 
Lekachman does not detach the theory from time and circumstances. "If 
Keynes had survived into the 1960's, he would surely be busy inventing a 
new and better post-Keynesian doctrine, directed at eliminating poverty 
and gross inequality of income distribution and improving the quality 
of English and American daily life." 
The development of Keynes' thought. Lekachman's work is a case 
study in the origin and diffusion of an economic idea. Keynes' ideas 
emerged out of a process of interaction with his talented colleagues at 
Kings College, Cambridge. Keynes proceeded slowly, borrowing from 
others, making successive approximations over two decades, until finally 
he fully and systematically developed his ideas. He was no different than 
others in experiencing the vise like grip of the older traditional theory. 
At an early stage, both he and his close colleague, D. H. Robertson, con-
sidered and pondered temporary departures from full employment. But 
to construct a general case of equilibrium output at less than full employ-
ment, as Keynes did in The General Theory, required considerably more 
boldness and originality in thought and action. The steps in the develop-
ment of Keynes' thinking can be seen through a chronological examina-
tion of his writing. 
Even his early publication, Economic Consequence of the Peace, 1919, 
evidenced a concern with instability in the capitalist world. His writings 
on economic theory begin slightly later. First in his Tract on Monetary 
Reform, published in 1923. In it he pointed explicitly to the destabilizing 
effects of a fluctuating price level. And " 'deflation is, if we rule out exag-
gerated inflations . . . the worse; because it is worse, in an impoverished 
world, to provoke unemployment than to disappoint the rentier.' " One 
of the functions of state policy ought to be the stabilization of the stan-
dard of value. 
In 1930, Keynes' next major work, Treatise on Money, came out. It 
carried the analysis one further step away from the self adjusting and 
full employment model of the classical economists. Keynes denied the 
classical assumption of an automatic interest rate mechanism equating 
investment and full employment savings. There is much in the Treatise 
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which anticipates the later General Theory. But the break in the link 
between savings and investment contains ambiguity and is not general. 
At this early stage, D. H. Robertson and Keynes worked together on 
the break in the relationship between savings and investment. Besides 
this help, in 1931, Keynes received further aid from R. F. Kahn of King's 
College, Cambridge. In this year, Kahn published an article defining the 
concept of the multiplier—the relationship between a change in invest-
ment and the alteration in the size of national income which that change 
caused. The multiplier became an important concept in Keynes' major 
work, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936. 
Nonetheless, Keynes must be given full credit for the basic insight of a 
general equilibrium at less than full employment. 
In The General Theory, Keynes' earlier insights are carried to their 
logical limits. The main relationship involves the determination of out-
put and employment levels by the magnitude of effective demand. The 
latter, in turn, depends upon the spending decisions of consumers, busi-
ness firms and governments. And there is nothing inherent in the econ-
omy to bring demand up to a full employment level. However, govern-
ment expenditures and taxation are the policy controls. They hold the 
potential of regulating effective demand at the desired level. 
Diffusion of Keynesian ideas. In both Great Britain and the United 
States, political instinct preceded economic analysis. In the former, as 
early as 1924, Lloyd George preached public investment as the remedy 
when private investment failed. And in the United States the New Deal 
public works projects, at least to 1938, were instinctive responses to cir-
cumstance, rather than policy inferred from theoretical analysis. 
Lekachman's account of the diffusion of Keynesian ideas in the 
United States is an interesting one. Young economists, such as Alvin 
Hansen, Seymour Harris and Paul Samuelson, were the first converts. 
Then in order of acceptance came junior government officials, senior 
government officials, certain labor, farm and business interest groups, 
and only recently, the public at large. 
The response of the well known Keynesian economist, Alvin Hansen, 
illustrates the initial mixed reaction felt even by the younger economists. 
Hansen's negative first impressions can be seen in his review of The 
General Theory. In a cool and reserved appraisal, he concluded that: 
" 'The book under review is not a landmark in the sense that it lays a 
foundation for a new economics.' " Soon after this review was written, 
however, Hansen's appraisal underwent a rapid change. By 1938, he had 
not only accepted Keynes' premises, but he added the pessimistic hypothe-
sis that the American economy had entered a period of long-run stagna-
tion. 
As World War II drew to a close, the ferment over Keynes' ideas 
extended to a political level. Liberal members of Congress embarked 
upon a course to institutionalize Keynesian analysis and policy. A fear 
of postwar stagnation overhung this effort. A very spirited fight ensued, 
and ended with at least modest victories for the liberal forces. Congress 
passed an act which charged the federal government with responsibility 
for maintaining high levels of employment. It also requested the Presi-
dent to submit an economic report to Congress. In addition, the act 
created both a Council of Economic Advisers, and a Joint Economic 
Committee in Congress to study and act upon the Report of the Presi-
dent. The legislation did not come up to the expectations of the liberals, 
but it nonetheless laid the basis for the achievements Heller describes. 
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Appraisal. While Lekachman carefully develops the intellectual 
avenues leading to The General Theory, he unfortunately neglects cir-
cumstance as a force propelling the intellectual process. For example, 
unemployment swelled as a political and social problem during the later 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And in the 1930's the situation 
became acute. This issue struck classical economic theory (with its 
assumption of automatic full employment) at its most vulnerable point. 
The political irrelevancy of advice based upon classical analysis is illus-
trated by Pigou's testimony before the British Macmillan Committee in 
1931. When asked to explain why unemployment was so high he could 
extend no aid more useful than a diagnosis that " 'The relative demand 
for labour in different occupations has altered, and the transfers of labour 
appropriate to those alterations have not taken place.' " It was the 
workers who must initiate the solution, not the government. All that 
the laborers needed to do was to shift jobs and accept lower wages if 
necessary. Then unemployment would disappear. 
The nonfeasibility of classical remedies for unemployment acted as a 
spur to the development of a new macro theory. Keynes and others in 
the Political Economy Club at King's College were concerned with unem-
ployment. And they were responsive to the need for practical solutions. 
Circumstances conducive to new theory also proceeded on a more 
fundamental level in the half century preceding the 1930's. Monopoly 
power grew in both business and labor, and financial institutions multi-
plied in number. These and other structural changes increased down-
ward rigidity in prices and wages. And they made interest rates less 
effective as a link between investment and full employment savings. 
Thus, structural changes undermined whatever full employment 
resilience the economies of Great Britain and the United States may have 
had. This factor plus long standing unemployment problems created 
environmental pressures favorable to a theory better able to explain 
modern capitalism. Lekachman incorporates external forces, such as 
these, only partially, and only by implication. Circumstance is not 
integrated into the process of intellectual change. 
Despite this omission, through Lekachman's able work, we see Heller's 
book as the product of and a report on the culminating stage in the 
triumph of an idea. The first phase is the 1930's, and Heller by contrast 
describes the 1960's. In the former decade, unemployment policies were 
merely direct pragmatic responses to circumstances. By contrast, an 
action such as the 1964 tax cut derives from theoretical and statistical 
analysis of the United States economy. Keynesian analysis has become 
an instrument for interpreting and ordering economic reality in its own 
right. Furthermore, opposing ideology and attitude have receded into 
ineffectiveness. However, this does not sound an end to our problems of 
unemployment and inflation. And a reading of Lekachman suggests a 
basic lesson and a warning; namely, the danger in a theory becoming a 
dogma. 
The lesson is clear if we review our experience with classical theory. 
The configuration of classical analysis, ideology and attitude clung tena-
ciously to people's minds long after it had outlived its relevance. By 
parallel, Heller tends to view Keynesianism with the same sense of 
adequacy we once viewed classicalism. He introduces appropriate quali-
fications and considers non-Keynesian problems, but a strong Keynesian 
syndrome remains. This is disturbing since there are indications that 
Keynesian analysis is as limited in its applicability to certain of our 
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unemployment and inflationary problems as classical analysis was to the 
employment problem of the 1930's. By contrast Lekachman's book, with 
its sensitivity to history, provides us with the kind of education against 
dogma that we badly need. 
John kenneth galbraith, the new industrial state 
Although Keynes rejected classical full employment assumptions, he 
nonetheless accepted much of the remainder of classical economic doc-
trine. For example, he accepted their theory of the firm. The result is a 
Keynesian model of unemployment equilibrium superimposed on an 
economy of small firms in competition over prices charged to consumers. 
Several important institutional features of our present economy are 
ignored. For instance, the behavior of those important industries domi-
nated by a few firms is missing. Also absent, is the competitive instru-
ment of large research and advertising budgets. These funds are the 
source of manipulation of consumer demand and of rapid technological 
advance. 
The point is that though Keynesian theory departs from older doc-
trine in certain respects, yet it precariously retains a tie in with the 
classical atomistic world. In an economy dominated by giant power 
concentrates in business and labor, their exclusion from formal considera-
tion, should, as a minimum, destroy complacency with views having 
Keynesian assumptions as their sole base. These considerations make 
Galbraith's The New Industrial State a second interesting book to place 
beside Heller's study. 
Industrial organization is the primary focus of attention in Gal-
braith's book. But since industrial structure and behavior bear directly 
on unemployment and inflation, their relevance to the subject of this 
review is obvious. 
In his usual style, Galbraith starts with his own vision of economic 
reality, rather than with what is assumed by conventional theory. The 
result is an interpretation of the behavior and the consequences of the 
industrial complex. 
Several of the behavioral characteristics and consequences of the large 
industrial firm are salient to the subject under review. First, Galbraith 
notes the existence of downward rigidity in industrial prices. When 
confronted with a decline in demand, monopoly firms prefer to absorb 
the impact through a curtailment of output and employment rather than 
by a reduction in prices. Second, since pricing to achieve a target rate 
of profits is the rule, firms do not necessarily charge a profit maximizing 
price. Thus, when faced by aggressive demands of unions, or if a higher 
rate of profit is desired, firms may be induced to raise prices even in the 
absence of excessive growth in aggregate demand, and even before full 
employment is reached. Third, rapid technological advance is a way of 
life for the large corporation. This places strains on the skill require-
ments of the labor force and is a factor of growing importance in 
unemployment. 
Two policy inferences follow. One is that programs to provide 
workers with necessary education and skill ought to hold top priority in 
combating unemployment. Second, just as downward price rigidities 
exist in the private sector, so also must upward price rigidities be estab-
lished by government, if excessive upswings in prices are to be avoided. 
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The wider meaning of these conclusions is clear. Older Keynesian 
policy instruments of controlling employment and prices through regula-
tion of aggregate demand are by themselves becoming increasingly less 
adequate in the present economy. 
The implicit criticism of Heller's book can be made specific. Heller 
does not supply leadership on newer economic problems and he also 
misplaces the emphasis. This is well illustrated at one point in his book. 
Heller cites the success of the 1964 tax cut as proof of the absence of 
significant structural unemployment. "Employment developments in 
1965-66 rendered a clear verdict on the structural unemployment thesis: 
the alleged hard core of unemployment lies not at 5 or 6 percent, but 
even deeper than 4 percent/' 
The evidence is inadequate. First, coincident with the period of tax 
cut effects, both the economic opportunity and the manpower training 
programs operated to remove lack of skill as a factor in unemployment. 
Also, during the second half of 1965, the military forces buildup of Viet-
nam War began to syphon off some of the potentially unemployed. Sec-
ond, unemployment among the unskilled, such as laborers, teenagers 
and non-whites, continued alarmingly high. And, in the past two years, 
prices have begun advancing at a faster rate. The point is not that rising 
demand was unimportant in reducing unemployment. It is rather that 
this relationship has been overdrawn. When aggregate demand is raised, 
structural unemployment in part becomes disguised, and in part the 
problem and costs it imposes are passed on to business, by inducing the 
latter to do the training or retraining. Thus, structural unemployment 
is both more serious and more complex than Heller's comments would 
lead the reader to believe. It is true that Heller includes qualifications. 
But the main thrust of emphasis is upon regulating the level of aggregate 
demand. 
conclusion 
Both Lekachman's historical study and Galbraith's appraisal of the 
new industrial state suggest that the Keynesian idea has now been fully 
absorbed. We have entered another period where a host of problems 
associated with rapid technological advance, urbanization and power 
concentrates have not yet been clearly analyzed. As a result, effective 
solutions, to say nothing about a commitment to carry them through, are 
not in sight. 
The main interest of Heller's book is as a good report on a final and 
important step in the institutionalization of Keynesian ideas. The rela-
tionships involved are still important. Heller, however, has regretably 
little to say on problems and issues outside the compass of Keynesian 
theory. It is not his intent to confront this sphere, but this does not 
entirely excuse a man of his Stature. Lekachman and Galbraith are both 
more imaginative in confronting a set of emerging problems as well as 
in showing awareness of the bases and limits of Keynesian doctrine. 
Bradley University Douglas Y. Thorson 
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